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“To his lot fell the heavy duty of thinking out afresh the whole poetic problem, 
of envisaging the poet’s task in its rarest form, of re¨ning the poet’s medium till 
it should be adequate to that task. His was the exceptional destiny to conceive 
the perfect work, to labour at it for more than twenty years in the interval of 
ungrateful drudgery and to die, exhausted by the tension of those years, when 
freedom at last had come.” – Christopher Brennan1
Un Coup de dés is one of the masterworks of modern literature, and a kind of 
summa of Stéphane Mallarmé’s lifework. It could not have been better served 
by writers and thinkers: on the one hand, it immediately transformed the ¨eld 
for working poets as diµerent as Paul Valéry and Christopher Brennan, as for 
so many more therea²er; on the other, a strong lineage of European philosophy 
registered the poem as an event for thought, encompassing Maurice Blanchot, 
J.-P. Sartre, Paul de Man, Jacques Derrida, Gilles Deleuze, Jacques Rancière, 
Alain Badiou, J.-C. Milner, Quentin Meillassoux, and many others.2 Confronted 
by this sequence of commentaries by great poets and philosophers, a contempo-
rary reader could be forgiven for experiencing the torment of a methodological 
and intellectual impasse. How could one add to this sequence of readings ex-
cept as a supernumerary number that could always be another? Yet how could 
one also not feel that the sequence itself demands another numbering or enu-
1 C. Brennan, Christopher Brennan, ed. T. Sturm, University of Queensland Press, St Lucia 
1984, pp. 206-7.
2 See, inter alia, J.-P. Sartre, Mallarmé, or the Poet of Nothingness, University Park, Penn 
State University, University Park 1988; M. Blanchot, The Work of Fire, trans. C. Mandell, 
Stanford University Press, Stanford 1995; J. Derrida, Acts of Literature, ed. D. Attridge, 
Routledge, New York 1992; J. Rancière, Mallarmé: The Politics of the Siren, trans. S. Corco-
ran, Continuum, London 2011; A. Badiou, Being and Event, trans. O. Feltham, Continuum, 
London 2005; Paul de Man, Blindness and Insight: Essays in the Rhetoric of Contemporary 
Criticism, Second Edition, intro. W. Godzich, Methuen, London 1983; J.-C. Milner, Constats, 
Gallimard, Paris 2002; Q. Meillassoux, The Number and the Siren, trans. R. Mackay, Urba-
nomic, Falmouth 2012.
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meration of the operations of the poem? Even more tormentingly, does not this 
double address itself mimic the structure of the limit as delivered by Mallarmé 
himself: the spontaneous eruption of the crowd of history, to which one cannot 
add except by subtracting oneself, as per the disappearance of the author, the 
puri¨cation of the verse, the becoming-abyssal of content? With these orienting 
reservations in mind, this article will accordingly take the route of a speculative 
reconstruction of a (one) sequence of thought that may have taken place for Un 
Coup de dés to become what it is, along the lines of the now-familiar, even banal 
paradox that a dispositif can only ¨ nd its own conditions of possibility following 
the act that retrospectively creates those very conditions.
As all its inheritors testify, the poem poses the question what is a poem? in and 
as a poem itself, according to the most strenuous conceptual criteria. As Martin 
Heidegger announces regarding his own adherence to certain poems of Frie-
drich Hölderlin: “I did not choose Hölderlin because his work, as one among 
many, realizes the universal essence of poetry, but rather because Hölderlin’s 
poetry is sustained by his whole poetic mission: to make poems solely about 
the essence of poetry. Hölderlin is for us in a preeminent sense the poet’s poet. 
And for that reason he forces a decision upon us.”3 If Heidegger himself did not 
and could not himself say the same of Mallarmé, there is no question that this 
remark can also serve as an orientation to the French aesthete: a poet’s poet who 
forces a decision upon us.
Yet the question concerning the “meaning of Mallarmé” cannot simply, pace 
Heidegger, be posed according to the (Romantic) problematic of language, na-
tion and people à la Hölderlin. Whereas Heidegger was consumed – especially 
in the 1930s-40s, for all the well-known reasons – with trying to think-through 
the problem of the truth of historicity of the German people according to the 
dictates of the work of art – Mallarmé’s moment is precisely not a nationalist 
one. Approximately a decade ago, Slavoj Žižek, launching a new Lacan Diction-
ary in Melbourne, remarked that Australia was precisely the right distance from 
Paris to be able to get Lacan right. The same goes, a fortiori, for Mallarmé. In a 
¨rst moment, then, I wish to mark the importance of Australia as a poetic site 
for the interpretation of Mallarmé – at once poetic, critical and parodic – from 
3 M. Heidegger, Elucidations of Hölderlin’s Poetry, trans. K. Hoeller, Humanity, New York 
2000, p. 52.
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Christopher Brennan, through Gardner Davies and A.D. Hope, to Chris Edwards 
and Rosemary Lloyd, David Brooks, John Hawke, and now Christian Gelder and 
Robert Boncardo.4 I don’t make this point for merely nationalist reasons, not 
least given that I have already doubted the putative “nationalism” of Mallarmé; 
on the contrary, as I will try to show, it rather is for odd poetic reasons. Part of 
the point will be that Mallarmé ushers in a new modality of possibility for a 
poetry no longer tied to its empirical or linguistic site; in doing so, however, his 
work has recourse to a kind of sibyllic syllabary that at once mimes and reverses 
the linguistic labours of European colonisation. 
This aspect of Mallarméan poetics can be con¨rmed by a number of indicators, 
not only along the chains of interpretation and in°uence I have already not-
ed, but in the symptoms constituted by the points-of-antagonism between the 
express statements of the most signi¨cant critics themselves. We can see this 
in Rancière speaking of Mallarmé’s “types” as correlated with the deracinated 
industrial design of Peter Behrens; in Friedrich Kittler, noting that Mallarmé’s 
“instant insight,” under new media pressure, that literature was nothing but the 
deployment of letters; or J.-C. Milner’s analyses that show how modern science 
renders all human experience patently imaginary.5 But it is also to be found in 
Badiou’s Theory of the Subject, regarding Mallarmé’s development of the rela-
tions between “the crowd” and poetic negation, or in Meillassoux’s doctrines 
regarding the situated problem for Mallarmé of the failure of Greek, Catholic 
and Wagnerian liturgy.6 To extend Robert Boncardo’s analyses here, it was not 
only great 20th century French philosophers who found Mallarmé exemplary of 
4 See, inter alia, C. Brennan, Prose-Verse-Poster-Algebraic-Symbolico-Riddle Musicopoe-
matographoscope & Pocket Musicopoematographoscope, ed. A. Clark, Hale and Iremonger, 
Erskineville 1981; G. Davies, Mallarmé and le drame solaire J. Corti, Paris 1959; R. Lloyd, 
Mallarmé: The Poet and his Circle, Cornell University Press, Ithaca and London 1999; C. 
Edwards, A Fluke, Monogene and Jacket, Sydney 2005; D. Brooks, The Sons of Clovis: Ern 
Malley, Adore Floupette, and a secret history of Australian Poetry, University of Queensland 
Press, Brisbane 2011; J. Hawke, Australian Literature and the Symbolist Movement, Univer-
sity of Wollongong Press, Wollongong 2009; C. Gelder and R. Boncado (eds.), Mallarmé: 
Rancière, Milner, Badiou, Rowman and Little¨eld, London 2017.
5 See J. Rancière, The Future of the Image, trans. G. Elliott, Verso, London 2007; F. Kittler, 
Optical Media, trans. A. Enns, Polity, Cambridge 2010; J.-C. Milner, L’Oeuvre claire: Lacan, 
la science, la philosophie, Seuil, Paris 1995.
6 See A. Badiou, Theory of the Subject, trans. B. Bosteels, Continuum, London 2009; Meillas-
soux, The Number and the Siren, passim.
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the bond between literature and politics, caught between the admirable intran-
sigence of his high art and its apparent concomitant rejection of poetry as the 
voice of the people.7 
Indeed, integral to this interpretative history is the constant sequence of philo-
sophical inversions of the sense of Mallarmé. For Sartre, Mallarmé exempli¨es 
a kind of complicit hermeticism; for Pierre Macherey, Octavio Paz and Rancière, 
Mallarmé is not at all hermetic, but a vital public artist; for Meillassoux, again, 
Mallarmé is entirely hermetic but not according to any political compromise.8 
Or, to take a diµerent track through the tangled thickets: Derrida shows Mal-
larmé’s excesses vis-à-vis metaphysics; whereas Pierre Campion sees Mallarmé 
attempting to make philosophy from literature, to discern a Sense in Mallarmé; 
and André Stanguennec sees the unleashing of a new ethics of poetry.9 
I will add to this sequence in turn, by pointing to a certain peculiarity regarding 
Mallarmé’s mission to purify verse, along the lines of writing a-poem-that-simul-
taneously-embodies-and-exposes-the-essence-of-poetry.10 To accomplish such a 
poem would be to produce pure poetry, that is, nothing but poetry itself, poetry 
itself as a (one) poem. But “to not to be anything else” means that such a poem 
must bear the mark of its own singularity within itself. Such a poem by de¨ni-
tion cannot work like anything else. Such a poem cannot pose the question of 
its essence philosophically, for instance, that is, propositionally or hypothetically. 
Such a poem would have resolve the question it poses as itself – actually. But, 
actually, what can actually then mean? At the very least, it must mean that the 
7 See R. Boncardo, Appropriations politiques de l’oeuvre de Stéphane Mallarmé, unpublished 
PhD thesis, Université d’Aix Marseille and University of Sydney, 2014.
8 In addition to those texts already cited, see P. Macherey, “The Mallarmé of Alain Badiou” 
in: G. Riera (ed.), Alain Badiou: Philosophy and its Conditions, SUNY, Albany 2005, pp. 109-
115; O. Paz, Marcel Duchamp: Appearance Stripped Bare, Arcade Books, New York 1990.
9 See P. Campion, Mallarmé: Poésie et philosophie, PUF, Paris 1994; A. Stanguennec, Mal-
larmé et l’éthique de la poésie, Vrin, Paris 1992.
10 This is my own rephrasing of what Bertrand Marchal famously calls La Religion de Mal-
larmé, José Corti, Paris 1988, or what other commentators have parsed as, for example, 
“The hymn of spiritual hearts,” Rancière, Mallarmé, pp. 24-42 or Meillassoux, pp. 106-113, 
where he remarks: “Thus the central stakes of Mallarméan poetry – at least from 1895, the 
year of the ¨rst publication of “Catholicism” – become those of its capacity or otherwise 
to produce a diµusion of the divine, by way of the convocation of a human Drama, at once 
real and of universal signi¨cance,” p. 112.
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discourse of poetry – or the poem – on its own being, on being, cannot be sepa-
rated from its own existence. Perhaps this doesn’t mean that being and existence 
would have to be one and the same for such a poem, but it does raise the question 
as to whether there can be any ontic-ontological diµerence for such a poem. For 
such a poem would be such a poem only insofar as its existence be too its being.
Yet this immediately raises questions about such a poem’s identity and unity, 
its apparition-value. For how can being = existence = identity = unity = recog-
nizable-as? Under such a description, if a poem is recognizable as a poem, then 
it isn’t a poem; it would merely have the form of a poem. But a poem cannot be 
reducible to its form. Not only because poetry has historically shown that it can 
harbour all forms, including the anti- or zero-degree form of the prose poem, 
itself a crucial interest of Mallarmé’s – therefore rendering any particular form 
a compromise of the pure poem – but because a poem cannot in principle be 
reducible to its form. No formal, technical, prosodic device, be it meter, rhythm, 
sense, or enjambment can serve such an existential role. Nor, of course, can a 
pure poem be reduced to its content; again, poetry self-evidently has no par-
ticular content, even if we wanted to say its proper content is nothing. Neither 
form nor content, then. Not in general, nor in particular. Any pure poem would 
be historically situated by its particular form, thereby immediately compromis-
ing its purity. No poem can be recognizable as a poem if it is to be a pure poem. 
We may now also consider the preposterous converse of this proposition: not 
everything that is not recognizable as a poem is potentially a poem. 
To be a poem not recognizable as a poem but nevertheless a poem, in fact, the/a 
pure poem, such a poem would still have to detain something to distinguish it 
from all those other things not recognizable as poems. It would have to inscribe 
internally and integrally a peculiar mark – perhaps itself unrecognisable – of its 
own pure poetryness. Or, in another vocabulary, it couldn’t have any of the pred-
icates of a poem, nor could it simply share the absence of such predicates. One 
possible solution would be that what gives a poem its identity as a pure poem 
would be that it present itself as positively not-having the predicates that would 
make it a poem, in a form of Kantian in¨nite judgement. This would be a para-
doxical form of self-nomination as neither non-nomination nor non-non-nomi-
nation, a mark of the suspension of the poem above the abyss of itself. The pure 
poem would name itself by not-naming and not-not-naming itself with a single 
stroke. This seems like a di½cult trick to pull oµ. Yet can it be done?
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Throughout his work, the Italian philosopher Giorgio Agamben has regularly 
foregrounded the decisive agency of deixis in and for philosophy. In Language 
and Death, Agamben writes that “the problem of being – the supreme metaphys-
ical problem – emerges from the very beginning as inseparable from the problem 
of the signicance of the demonstrative pronoun, and for this reason it is always 
already connected with the eld of indication.”11 The demonstrative pronoun 
is today part of the grammatical study of deixis.12 Deictics are fundamental to 
all natural languages. Agamben: “every language has at its disposal a series of 
signs (which linguistics call [sic.] ‘shi²ers’ or indicators of enunciation, among 
which, for example, there are the pronouns ‘I,’ ‘you,’ ‘this,’ and the adverbs 
‘here,’ ‘now,’ etc.) destined to allow the individual to appropriate language in 
order to use it.”13 Shi²ers have a number of peculiar properties: although they 
are integral to the use of every language, they have no meaning in themselves; 
they take on their meaning through a contextual re°exivity of performance. As 
Emile Benveniste writes, “I signi¨es ‘the person who is uttering the present in-
stance of the discourse containing I.’ This instance is unique by de¨nition and 
has validity only in its uniqueness. If I perceive two successive instances of dis-
course containing I, uttered in the same voice, nothing guarantees to me that 
one of them is not a reported discourse, a quotation in which I could be imputed 
to another.”14 Note Benveniste’s emphasis upon uniqueness here: uniqueness 
that establishes person, place, and time.
11 G. Agamben, Language and Death: The Place of Negativity, trans. K.E. Pinkus with M. 
Hardt, University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis 1991, pp. 16-17.
12 For a useful introduction to the study of deixis, see L. Edmunds, “Deixis in Ancient Greek 
and Latin Literature: Historical Introduction and State of the Question,” Philologia Anti-
qua, 1 (2008), pp. 67-98.
13 G. Agamben, Remnants of Auschwitz: The Witness and the Archive, trans. D. Heller-Roazen, 
Zone, New York 1999, p. 115.
14 E. Benveniste, Problems in General Linguistics, trans. M.E. Meek, University of Miami 
Press, Florida 1971, p. 218. Benveniste continues: “This constant and necessary reference 
to the instance of discourse constitutes the feature that unites to I/you a series of ‘indi-
cators’ which, from their form and systematic capacity, belong to diµerent classes, some 
being pronouns, others adverbs, and still others, adverbial locutions,” p. 218. In yet an-
other essay he adds: “The personal pronouns provide the ¨rst step in this bringing out 
of subjectivity in language. Other classes of pronouns that share the same status depend 
in their turn upon these pronouns. These other classes are the indicators of deixis, the 
demonstratives, adverbs, and adjectives, which organize the spatial and temporal rela-
tionships around the ‘subject’ taken as referent: ‘this, here, now,’ and their numerous cor-
relatives, ‘that, yesterday, last year, tomorrow,’ etc. They have in common the feature of 
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Perhaps the most famous philosophical meditation on the problems posed 
by deixis can be found in Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit. In the section “A. 
Consciousness,” under “I. Sense-Certainty: or the ‘This’ and ‘Meaning,’” Hegel 
writes, that the ¨rst, immediate knowledge of the object means that “the sin-
gular consciousness knows a pure ‘This,’ or the single item.”15 Yet, as Hegel at 
once adds, “the ‘This’ splits into a ‘Here’ and a ‘Now,’ and, in the inscription of 
this Now and this Here, it becomes indiµerent to its own truth. ‘This’ is there-
fore ‘the universal This’; or, ‘it is,’ i.e., Being in general.”16 By deixis, we assert a 
singular truth that immediately contradicts its own singularity, introducing the 
temporality of auto-negation through the attribution of indexicality: the Here, 
for instance, becomes in itself “a ‘simple togetherness of many Heres.’”17 A shi²-
er therefore simultaneously: anchors an utterance to its speaker; refers to the 
context of its own taking place; indicates a singularity that, in being so indicat-
ed, exposes its own multiplicity; is implied in every utterance; must always be 
repeated; self-diµers in its very utterance; opens the road to universality by a 
minimal form of negation. 
A shi²er is therefore the enaction of the “point” at which language interrupts 
itself by exposing the conditions of its own taking-place. In saying “I,” then, 
individuals become subjects at the same moment that they become other than 
they are (i.e., they are simultaneously de-subjectivised). In doing so, at least in 
Agamben’s interpretation, a shi²er also exposes the Thing – the other of lan-
guage that can emerge only within language. A shi²er may seem to eµect the 
transition from world to language, but in fact it eµects an intra-linguistic shi² 
(“from langue to parole” or “from code to message” or “from semantic to semiot-
ic”). It is this problem of deixis that Agamben considers as the place of the Voice 
of language, the radically negative foundation of Western metaphysics. In this 
sense, the problematic of reference is at once foregrounded and complicated by 
the irreducibility of the event of deixis.
being de¨ned only with respect to the instances of discourse in which they occur, that is, 
in dependence upon the I which is proclaimed in the discourse,” p. 226.
15 G.W.F. Hegel, The Phenomenology of Spirit, trans. A.V. Miller with analysis and foreword 
J.N. Findlay, Oxford University Press, Oxford 1977, p. 59.
16 Hegel, op. cit., p. 60.
17 Hegel, op. cit., p. 66.
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If “ordinary language” then, or even what we might call in a Benjaminian mode 
“language as such,” cannot forego such an event of reference, this is not nec-
essarily the case for mathematical formalization. On the contrary. Formaliza-
tion, as opposed to form, requires the indiµerence of all or any particular set of 
letters to what they can be deployed to demonstrate. Yet it is precisely for this 
reason that the principles of their deployment must be explicitly and essentially 
manifested in and by their deployment itself. Moreover, this must be done imma-
nently to the demonstration: at every point of a mathematical demonstration the 
linkages between steps of a proof and the principles of such linkages must be 
practically shown as inseparable. Indeed, formalization can be considered the 
immanent rendering-consistent of the indiµerence of its own contingent mate-
rials. In mathematical and logical systems, this rendering-consistent – at least 
in classical and intuitionist logics – is equivalent to the impossibility of produc-
ing any contradiction within that system. So consistency is what mathematics 
and logic inseparably do and what they think in and by this doing. To put this 
yet another way, the diµerence between appearing and doing or between show-
ing and proving is itself indiµerent in mathematical practice – and only in this 
practice. This is equivalent to what Brian Rotman, from an essentially Peircean 
perspective, derisively refers to in mathematical formalization as being “com-
pletely without indexical expressions.”18 Mathematical formalization’s indiµer-
ence to empirical criteria – more precisely, any external referent – is ensured 
precisely through the eµective suppression of any markers of the taking-place 
of the “utterance,” which is therefore not an utterance in any existing semiot-
ic sense. The suppression of deixis simultaneously suppresses the moment of 
reference to the speaker, the context, and to any particular empirical thing. As 
such, this peculiarity of mathematical formalization – its elaboration of a pure 
syntax through suppression of all deictic markers – can also seem to give it, as 
18 B. Rotman, Ad innitum: The Ghost in Turing’s Machine: Taking God Out of Mathematics 
and Putting the Body Back In, Stanford University Press, Stanford 1993, p. 7. Rotman’s very 
interesting book nonetheless suµers from a number of serious problems, evident in the 
current context. Above all, his understanding of what constitutes “Platonism” is quite 
naïve, and certainly unable to account for Badiou’s peculiar interpretation. Another prob-
lem is that, despite Rotman’s emphasis on the materiality of mathematical signi¨cation, 
he doesn’t quite separate – as the French thinkers in Lacan’s wake have – the “signi¨er” 
and the “letter,” such a distinction enabling a more detailed, materialist and persuasive 
account of the issues. For a longer account of what I argue here, see J. Clemens, “Can Math-
ematics Think Genre? Alain Badiou and Forcing,” in: V. Duché et al. (eds.), Genre, Text and 
Language: Mélanges Anne Freadman, Garnier, Paris 2015, pp. 203-223.
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philosophy has historically recurrently believed from Plato to Badiou, a peculiar 
ontological destiny.
But is this suppression of ordinary-language deixis through the asemantic intri-
cation of letters not moreover one of the most notorious aspects of Mallarméan 
poetics? And is it not self-confessedly at stake according to the rigours of num-
ber? As Derrida himself phrases the Mallarméan wager, in a brief encyclopaedia 
entry: “A text is made to do without references; either to the thing itself…. or to 
the author who consigns to it nothing except its disappearance.”19 Or, as Derrida 
puts it elsewhere, speaking of Mallarmé’s Mimique: the text engages a kind of 
“reference without referent.”20 What I wish to argue that Mallarmé shares with 
mathematical reasoning is therefore a kind of suppression of deixis, the “elo-
cutionary disappearance” of author to the bene¨t of a “°ower absent from all 
bouquet.” Yet pure poetry is not for all that mathematics; it does not engage in 
theorems and proofs in the same way. Mallarmé is certainly not reducing mathe-
matics to poetry. Rather, he is confronting ordinary language with mathematics 
in order to produce a third thing. That third thing is the poem, puri¨ed. So what 
are the details and the sense of the operations by which Mallarmé essays to sup-
press ordinary language by mathematical means to the bene¨t of poetry? How, 
exactly, does this cash out in Un Coup de dés? My answer is relatively simple: 
Mallarmé accomplishes this through a syllabarization of writing, that is, by de-
composing and reconstructing the minimal bond that binds letters in order that 
they make words and, in this reconstruction, extends this operation of binding 
across the surface of the page itself. Hence Mallarmé’s famous declaration that: 
“We need a guarantee – Syntax –.” Instead, however, of syntax being delivered 
by deduction in the service of consistency, Mallarmé establishes the claims of 
syntax through compositional disposition across the site of writing itself.
When Aristotle starts to worry about the identity of objects in the Metaphysics, 
he comes up against a fundamental paradox. For an object to be an object, it 
must be more than the sum of its parts; but this individuating element cannot 
be another relation, since that would lead to an in¨nite regress. Contradiction 
is in tension with the abyss in the thought of identity. A philosopher, it seems, 
19 Derrida, Acts of Literature, p. 113.
20 See J. Derrida, Dissemination, trans. B. Johnson, University of Chicago Press, Chicago 1981, 
passim.
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cannot be happy with either pole (contradiction and dissemination must be 
foreclosed), but any attempt to explain a thing’s principle – that by which that 
thing is that thing – broaches this aporia. At this point, Aristotle has recourse to 
an extraordinary double comparison:
Now since that which is composed of something in such a way that the whole is 
a unity; not as an aggregate is a unity, but as a syllable is – the syllable is not the 
letters, nor is BA the same as B and A; nor is °esh ¨ re and earth; because a²er dis-
solution the compounds, e.g. °esh or the syllable, no longer exist; but the letters 
exist, and so do ¨re and earth. Therefore the syllable is some particular thing; not 
merely the letters, vowel and consonant, but something else besides. And °esh is 
not merely ¨re and earth, or hot and cold, but something else besides. Since then 
this something else must be either an element or composed of elements, [20] (a) 
if it is an element, the same argument applies again; for °esh will be composed of 
this and ¨re and earth, and again of another element, so that there will be an in-
¨nite regression. And (b) if it is composed of elements, clearly it is composed not 
of one (otherwise it will itself be that element) but of several; so that we shall use 
the same argument in this case as about the °esh or the syllable. It would seem, 
however, that this “something else” is something that is not an element, but is 
the cause that this matter is °esh and that matter a syllable, and similarly in 
other cases. And this is the substance of each thing, for it is the primary cause of 
its existence. And since, although some things are not substances, all substances 
are constituted in accordance with and by nature, substance would seem to be 
this “nature,” which is not an element but a principle. An element is that which is 
present as matter in a thing, and into which the thing is divided; e.g., A and B are 
the elements of the syllable.21
Flesh and syllable – what a doublet! – it is as if Aristotle, whether consciously 
or not, is alluding to his own strictures in the Politics regarding man as the only 
animal which has language and politics, here renders that man and that lan-
guage down to their basic components in which the very connection of elements 
becomes obscure, to their esh and to their syllables. For Aristotle, the form of 
21 Aristotle, Metaphysics 7, 1041beta, 10-30. http://www.perseus.tu²s.edu/hopper/text?doc=
Perseus%3Atext%3A1999.01.0051%3Abook%3D7%3Asection%3D1041b Accessed 13 Octo-
ber 2016. Note the (symptomatic?) introduction of the bolded shi²ers by the translator(s) 
here in an attempt to clarify Aristotle’s propositions.
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the object provides its unity, as well as its identity in concert with its materials 
(form + matter = individual, as the Scholastics will later specify).
But this solution is unacceptable for Mallarmé, for whom form cannot (or can 
no longer) be a criterion of identity for the poem, at least under any received de-
scription of form, type, or idea. Is it then matter that matters? As we have already 
noted, every Mallarméan image disappears itself; it is, in fact, is an ensemble of 
disappearances.22 So let us take one counter-Aristotelian determination serious-
ly, to suggest that it is precisely the unavowed or suppressed political relation of 
°esh and syllable to humanity that remains at stake in Un Coup de dés. When 
commentators invoke Aristotle in the context of Mallarmé – which is occasion-
ally the case – their authoritative texts tend to be the Poetics and the Rheto-
ric, not the Metaphysics. It is the questions of mimesis, theatre, and writing that 
preponderantly seem to occupy the critics. Yet this does not quite enable us to 
explain Mallarmé’s doctrine regarding “ – Syntax – .” For what sort of guarantee 
is syntax anyway?
For Aristotle, invention is precisely a topology: it is the placement or disposition 
(taxis, the second part of rhetoric) that is at stake in the exposition (hypokrisis, 
actio) of syllables, in and from which the trace (memoria) is confounded with its 
elocution (style). So let us here revisit some of the syllabic hijinks familiar to Mal-
larméans. In his already-cited entry to the Tableau of French Literature (1974), 
Derrida characteristically oµers a characterization of Mallarmé as deploying 
syntax as undecidable: “The syntax of the short word or is sometimes calculated 
to prevent us from deciding whether it is the noun ‘gold,’ the logical conjunction 
‘or,’ or the adverb of time, ‘now.’”23 As Derrida continues: “Mallarmé has also, 
by disintegration, liberated its energy. The word, for him, is no longer the pri-
mary element of the language… Mallarmé knew that his ‘operation’ on the word 
was also the dissection of a corpse; of a decomposable body each part of which 
could be of use elsewhere.”24 Derrida provides a familiar list: l’or, des lors (from 
22 Here, see Badiou’s extraordinary analyses of the three versions of negation operative in 
Mallarmé, e.g., in Conditions, trans. S. Corcoran, Continuum, London 2008; Milner on 
the problematic of the constellation in “Les Constellations Révélatrices,” Elucidation, 8-9 
(2003), pp. 3-7; Rancière on the work of types in Mallarmé in The Future of the Image, etc.
23 Derrida, “Mallarmé,” p. 114.
24 “Related to the whole of nature and in this way coming closer to the organism that pos-
sesses life, the Word presents itself, in its vowels and its diphthongs, like a piece of °esh, 
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then on), dorure (gilding), dehors (outside), fantasmagoriques (phantasmagori-
cal), tresor (treasure), horizon (horizon), majore (increase), hors (outside), etc. 
To which could at once be added: sonore, encore, alors…and many more. The 
point here is that a syllable is precisely a non-decomposable composite body. If 
a letter is, in Aristotle’s own terms, a stoikeion, an element, and words (sense) 
are aggregates that are precisely decomposable into their elements (letters), a 
syllable is composed of elements yet is not decomposable back into those ele-
ments without losing the principle of its unity: it is an atomic compound, much 
like the chemical elements of the periodic table, itself one of the great scienti¨c 
inventions of the later nineteenth century.25
If this “operation” is a well-known aspect of Mallarmé’s method, its import has 
not always been treated very perspicuously or persuasively. One of the notable 
lapses in the tradition is that nobody (to my knowledge, anyway) has linked this 
dependence on or to a key element of Poe’s extraordinarily important essay on 
“The Philosophy of Composition,” an essay that had its most decisive impact 
upon the great French poets of the late nineteenth century, Mallarmé included.26 
Why is this essay relevant here? Because it is Poe’s account of the (literally) liter-
al mechanics of the construction and functioning of The Raven. And what is the 
refrain of this famous poem? The word Nevermore! Yet this word qua refrain is 
really a doubled refrain: if the word nevermore can repeat, it is because it is itself 
comprised of an absolutely fundamental syllable, that itself repeats in a variety 
of words throughout: or. For Poe, the repetitive variations upon the “or” sound 
itself become nothing more than a mechanism for generating aµect. Mallarmé 
is not above polylingual punnings (homonymic scramblings) along this line: Ce 
lever de lune or resonates with Lenore, Lunar, Lore, Law, Laura, etc. But what is 
determining here is that it enables us to see that it is the exigencies of general-
ized syllabic disposition – neither simply literal nor verbal – that is one crucial 
and, in its consonants, like a skeletal structure di½cult to dissect. Etc. etc. etc. If life nour-
ishes itself from its own past, or from a continual death, Sciene will trace this fact in lan-
guage….” Mallarmé, Les mots anglais.
25 Dmitri Mendeleev published what is widely considered the ¨rst version of the Periodic 
Table in 1869.
26 E.A. Poe, “The Philosophy of Composition,” Graham’s Magazine, XXVIII (4 April 1846), pp. 
163-167. See Marie Blaise, “Mallarmé et Poe: “la personne analogue,” in Mallarmé herme-
neute, Acts de colloques et journées d’étude, 10 (2014), http://ceredi.labos.univ-rouen.fr/
public/?Mallarmé-et-poe-la-personne.html, accessed 6 July 2015. 
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moment of the Mallarméan intervention. Mallarmé is an anti-philosophical poet 
neither of the word nor the letter – but of the syllable. The syllable is the primor-
dial apparition of syntax as such: it is simultaneously speech and writing; it is 
one and multiple at the same time; it cannot be permuted without becoming 
other than it is. A syllable is the pure element of language, insofar as it binds 
letters to letters, letters to sounds, language to its topos.27
We can verify these properties by recourse to a perhaps-unexpected source. This 
source is none other than late nineteenth-century Imperial linguistic anthro-
pology. In the 29 April 1887 issue of Science, an anonymous author reports on 
“A System of Orthography for Native Names of Place”: “The Royal geographical 
society of London, and the Société de géographie of Paris, have each adopted a 
system of geographical orthography which is intended to put an end to the exist-
ing confusion in the mode of spelling in maps and books.”28 What is absolutely 
crucial to note about this attempt by the respective Societies to promote such a 
standardization of nomination is that it is not only intended to ensure scienti¨c 
and commercial security along epistemological and pragmatic lines. Rather, the 
very attempt – however uncertain or insu½cient – is also directed at ensuring 
a regular capture of non-Western oral languages by Roman script. If the arti-
cle’s author then proceeds to complain that “the individuality and nationality 
of the author give the sound a peculiar character which not at all corresponds 
to the word as pronounced by the natives,” we see that “the rules adopted by 
the societies named can only help the explorer who is not at all acquainted with 
linguistics – which every explorer ought to be – to write down the names in an 
intelligible form.” What, in other words, underpins such colonial programs of 
27 Meillassoux’s striking interpretation suµers from various weaknesses, including that he 
never fully or seriously questions that the basic unit of language is the word. Indeed, he 
busies himself to assert that the unit of Mallarmé’s count cannot be “syllables or some 
other unit of language”: “For to count the words is to play with the indeterminacy of 
compound words, and thus to be able to make of one of them – the one whose meaning 
summarizes the entire project – the cause of that ultimate reversal of the code into its un-
certainty. And perhaps this was the secret ambition of the Coup de dés: to write the most 
beautiful peut-être in the French language, the cause of itself in its letters of ¨re,” The 
Number and the Siren, p. 214. In the context, such an assertion can only seem an exempla-
ry instance of logical question-begging.
28 Anon., “A System of Orthography for Native Names of Place,” Science, 29 April (1887), 
p. 421.
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uniform orthography, is a commitment to a theory of universal composition de-
pendent on a form of translinguistic syllabarization.29
Whether or not Mallarmé himself knew of and considered the implications of 
such “scienti¨c” attempts, I have as yet been unable to ascertain.30 Yet it is clear 
that, between Poe’s “poetic” deployment of the syllable in his philosophy of 
composition, and the attempts of colonial anthropologists to generate a uniform 
orthography capable of capturing and inscribing the never-before-heard words 
of utterly unrelated “native” tongues, the question of the foundational powers 
of the syllable as the minimal syntactic unit of language was indisputably “in 
the air.” Mallarmé himself proposes several notorious investigations into the 
problematic of the translation and transcription of languages, including his 
“pedagogical” grammar Thèmes anglais pour toutes les grammaires, and his 
“scienti¨c” study Les mots anglais: petite philologie à l’usage des classes et du 
monde.31 In the latter in particular, we ¨nd, for example, Mallarmé’s famously 
aberrant discussions of supposed laws of reduplication and permutation which 
presuppose, despite the lack of any supreme language, operators of translin-
guistic syntax.
This situation is perhaps most express and fraught in French letters in the nine-
teenth century, due to at least two related factors. First, the alexandrine seems 
to have dominated French poetry in a more imperious way than had compa-
rable formal measures in other languages. The iambic pentameter in English 
29 For a brief, accessible account of some of the basic elements of such orthographic pro-
grams, see David Moore, “A uniform orthography and early linguistic research in Aus-
tralia,” https://hiphilangsci.net/2013/10/16/a-uniform-orthography-and-early-linguistic-
research-in-australia/ accessed 13 October 2016. I coin the barbarous neologism “sylla-
barization” because, precisely, it chimes with barbarization, as well as with sybaritic.
30 For a diµerent account, see A. Stanguennec, “Fiction poétique et vérité morale chez Mal-
larmé,” Littérature, 111 (3/1998), pp. 11-27, which notes that the poet was a contemporary 
with the rise of Comtean positivism. Regarding Mallarmé’s colonial or anti-colonial piste, 
there seems to be relatively little written on the subject. Vladimir Klima cites J.I. Gleason 
linking Mallarmé to négritude: “Négritude as a poetic objectifying process, therefore, is 
a re-creation of the absent and as such is closely linked to the methodology of the sym-
bolist poet, Mallarmé…this is négritude’s romantic, passive side. The active aspect is an 
attack on colonialism,” in: V. Klima et al. (eds), Black Africa: Literature and Langauge, D. 
Reidel,Hingham 1977, pp. 66-7.
31 S. Mallarmé, Thèmes anglais pour toutes les grammaires, Gallimard, Paris 1937; Les mots 
anglais: petite philologie à l’usage des classes et du monde, Leroy frères, Paris 1877.
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versi¨cation, for example, had never been quite as central as the alexandrine 
in French. Second, the alexandrine is a function of a pure count, 12 vowels (or 
syllables) usually considered to be broken by the caesura into two groups of 
6/6, rather than, as in syllabic accentual metres, a combination of count and 
stress. Yet, as I have been arguing, the relation between the alexandrine and 
free verse has put the count into question for Mallarmé. As Rancière phrases it: 
“In Mallarmé’s epoch, one had ‘forgotten the manoeuvre,’ lost with the ancient 
bar of the alexandrine which had been sabotaged by the adept of uneven verse 
and then that of free verse, before being carried to its tomb by the Hugolian 
ogre.”32 In French, then, there had been the necessity of a count at the very base 
of poetry, a count that had recently been ruined by poets themselves. A simple 
count of the syllables of a line could therefore no longer function to guarantee 
the presence of poetry. Moreover, if one wishes to create a pure poem under 
such circumstances, it certainly cannot be mistaken for prose, nor for any par-
ticular form (for which the alexandrine had been the paradigm in French): such 
a poem must now somehow, impossibly, mark simultaneously the necessity of 
form and the necessity of a negation-of-form. As the syllable is the very basis of 
both prosody and prose (so to speak), by way of the fact that while the syllable is 
not-yet-language, there is no language without the syllable, it will be the radical 
implementation of an operation upon this primary pre-semantic binding condi-
tion of both sense and nonsense that Mallarmé eµects.
Yet it will not be the syllable “itself” (or any particular syllable) as a simple 
ground, but the principle that enables a syllable to be a syllable. That is, sylla-
bles function in Un Coup de dés as the element of the count that makes-poetry-
poetry-when-no-particular-inherited-number-can-hold-any-longer. A syllable 
can do this because it is the most basic moment of articulation of any language, 
whether ordinary, mathematical, or poetic. As I have already elaborated above, 
a syllable binds letters (which require some kind of syntax to organize their 
deployment) before they are words (which presume a syntax that they show but 
don’t say), etc. Of course, a syllable cannot alone de¨ne the essence of poetry, 
no more than the word or Word. On the contrary, if the syllable is a condition of 
all language and all languages, Mallarmé makes it what-is-not-itself-one-but-
is-the-unit-of-the-count-which-itself-makes-the-unique-number-that-cannot-
be-another.
32 Rancière, op. cit., p. 54.
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Because classical French prosody required the pronunciation and elision of cer-
tain syllables that would otherwise go un/enounced, then the recitation of French 
verse inevitably comes to produce weird foam-chimera-syllables that appear and 
vanish at once. This particular mode of reading is usually dependent on the rec-
ognition of a verse as a verse: here, given the dis-appearance or rather dis-lo-
cation of the standard line, any putative reading must encounter undecidables 
of enunciation, let alone undecidables of direction and sense. The concomitant 
absorption of the “musicality” of the verse (or even musical notation) as syllables 
means here that we are forced to know that we cannot know if we ought to sound 
out what is notated, even as the popping bubbles of ocean foam or champagne 
¨zz are tickling the hairs of our ears and noses. Likewise, all the numbers that are 
regularly cited as expressly Mallarméan – 0, 1, 5, 6, 7, 12, and so on – are certainly 
present here in their operatory spectrality, as emanatory actualities of the poem 
in its purity, but none of them can function as the secret of a cipher.
It is precisely here that a close reading of Un Coup de dés needs to be done (if 
there is unfortunately not the space here to do so) in order to verify the sequence 
of hypotheses I have elaborated: 1) Mallarmé seeks to write a “pure” poem; 
2) such a poem must indiµerentiate the ontic and ontological, that is, it must 
negate the ontological diµerence and, thereby, cannot be identi¨ed with or by 
any particular form, nor with any lack-of-form; 3) to this end, Mallarmé recog-
nizes the possibilities oµered by mathematical writing, whose deductive syntax 
is achieved through the suppression of deixis; 4) if it is letters that provide the 
basis for mathematical formalization, it is the syllable that provides the basis for 
Mallarméan formalization, as the fundamental atomic compound of language; 
5) but because the syllable cannot function in a pure poem by being given an 
inherited number or function (e.g., the 12-count of an alexandrine), nor simply 
an indiµerent number (e.g., the arbitrariness of a syllabic count in free verse or 
prose), it must be now otherwise deployed; 6) this deployment compels a con-
struction of the poem as a total, topological distribution of syllables in space; 
7) the “numbers” with which the poem is undoubtedly playing cannot be re-
duced to a particular “count,” whether of syllables, words, or pages: if anything, 
the poem is itself the “One” which sutures event to being.
So if the poem thus names itself as the apparition of itself – not the °ower absent 
from all bouquets, as Mallarmé says, but poetry absently present in and as the/a 
poem whose elements uncannily appear and disappear because their being can-
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not be separated from their appearance33 – is there another way to specify its 
particular modality of inconsistency? One could invoke logic to ask: is the pure 
poem contradictory or paraconsistent? Indeed, there is now a well-developed 
discourse on poetry that renders it eminently contradictory, inconsistent in the 
classical sense. In their very diµerent ways, one could see critics such as Derri-
da, Badiou and Meillassoux all sharing such a doctrine. But one can also con-
struct a paraconsistent structure by rendering an object intransitive. As Graham 
Priest puts it, regarding such a situation (which he himself calls “dialethics”): 
“the transitivity of identity will fail. We have a = x and x = c, but we will not have 
a = c.”34 However, Priest’s object – his name is “gluon” – is not poetry or poetic 
in the particular sense I am describing here. Between the commentators who 
end by rendering poetry a paradoxical nomination of the event of which it is a 
part, qua without-being, trans-being (event) or can-being (peut-être), and those 
who are concerned with identity-in-general (being), we will say that Mallarmé’s 
ultimate poetics is neither eventual nor paraconsistent, but puritan. Between 
inconsistency and paraconsistency, there is poetry. Pure poetry.
Drawing on the mathematical triplet that establishes equivalence relations in 
the construction of objects – re°exivity, transitivity, symmetry – we are able to 
parse Mallarmé’s reference-without-referent more precisely. Given a relation P 
(for “Poetry”) on U (for “Un Coup de dés”), P is re°exive on U if every element 
u of U, that is, its syllabic disposition, satis¨es the relation with itself, that is, 
(u, u) P. Un Coup de dés is a model of such a re°exive set; it is itself a universe. 
What’s interesting in this context about re°exivity – in distinction from transitiv-
ity and symmetry – is that, meta-mathematically speaking, it requires specied 
pairs to be in a relation, rather than given in general. For Mallarmé, one could 
hazard that a poem is only re°exive, that is, it models only the elements related 
to itself, “the unique number that cannot be another”; though it must also be 
intransitive as “the unique number that cannot be another”; and its symmetry 
could only be the automorphism of its re°exivity, insofar as this can be the only 
mapping of the object onto itself that preserves its identity. 
33 “I say: a °ower! and beyond the oblivion to which my voice relegates any shape, insofar as 
it is something other than the calyx, there arises musically, as the suave idea itself, the one 
absent from every bouquet,” Crise de vers.
34 G. Priest, One: Being an Investigation into the Unity of Reality and of its Parts, including the 
Singular Object which is Nothingness, Oxford University Press, Oxford 2014, p. 17. Priest 
uses here the Chinese symbol for “centre,” “zhong.”
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For the reasons I have already enunciated above, it is with the poem, and only 
the pure poem, that appearing and being can be one and the same. Such a poem 
would therefore be entirely composed of what Badiou calls in Logics of Worlds 
“real atoms.” In Badiou’s words: “A real atom is a phenomenal component, that 
is a kind of sub-apparent of the referential apparent which, on one hand, is 
an atomic component (it is simple, or non-decomposable), and on the other, is 
strictly determined by an underlying element , which is its ontological substruc-
ture. At the point of a real atom, being and appearing conjoin under the sign 
of the One.”35 This, in other words, is the meaning of Mallarmé’s symbolism: 
topological establishment of a real poem on the principle of syllabic binding of 
Un Coup de dés. A syllable cannot be further decomposed, as it would then be 
a letter: it both appears as such in its deployment, as in its further assemblage. 
This is why Un Coup de dés must be considered univocal. Not because it is not 
susceptible to irreducible interpretations, but because no syllable can be altered 
without transforming its identity. If a mathematical proof can use any symbols 
one likes, just so long as they are used consistently, but is rendered entirely false 
if any one of its letters fails to hold up, Un Coup de dés is rendered entirely false 
if the disposition of its syllables fails to maintain its peculiar lack-of-reference. If 
mathematics is axiomatic, declarative, invariant, poetry is anaxiomatic, in-sus-
pense, yet invariant. It is the presentation of the bond between appearing and 
being, in which every intensity of appearing is also an ontological element: in 
fact, Un Coup de dés is the “l’événemêtre” or “l’ êtrévenement” par excellence.
That Mallarmé only achieves this at the very end of his life is no accident. His 
lifelong eµorts regarding the rewriting of poems are famous, as are his constant 
experiments at the very limits of form. If we track this development according 
to the above argument, we can see at every point how his complex development 
concludes in the identi¨cation of the syllable – the syllable as minimal dispo-
sition in an open ¨eld – as the basis of all poetry, and therefore the “allegorical 
content” of the pure poem itself. If the prose poem obliterates the line-count 
and enjambment retained by traditional verse – the Scylla and Charybdis of the 
late nineteenth century crisis of verse – Un Coup de dés retains a variability of 
35 A. Badiou, Logics of Worlds, trans. A. Toscano, Continuum, London 2009, p. 250. Techni-
cally, the de¨nition is as follows: ‘If a given atom, dened by the function a(x), is identical 
to a single atom of the type a(x)—in other words, if there exists a single a ∈ A such that for 
every x ∈ A we have α(x) = a(x) = Id(a, x)—we will say that the atom α(x) is real.’ p. 250.
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count in the line by referring the syllable and enjambment to the disposition of 
each page, and thence to the totality of the pages of the poem, without simply 
obliterating the principle of the count itself. The poem is the constellation and 
the wreck whose apparitions it stages, the master and the die, the mast and the 
foam, thus becoming at once the real of writing, the turbulence of its own van-
ishing, and a crystalline absolute.
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